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STOCK PRICE REACTIONS TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1991

ABSTRACT
This paper provides the first empirical analysis of the FDIC Improvement Act's (FDICIA's)
impact on the banking industry. We examine the impact of events leading up to the Act's
passage on the market value and systematic risk of commercial banks. We find that (a) large
(small) bank stocks' value increased (decreased) as the FDICIA's passage became evident; and
(b) large banks' systematic risk decreased significantly over the period surrounding FDICIA,
while that of small banks did not change significantly. This supports Peltzman's (1976)
"buffering effect" hypothesis that the market viewed FDICIA as protective of large banks. We
postulate that such differences between large and small banks are due to risk-adjusted deposit
insurance premia and restrictions on access to the Federal Reserve's discount window introduced
through FDICIA.

STOCK PRICE REACTIONS TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1991

I.

Introduction

The dramatic escalation of bank failures in the U.S. during the late 1980's and early
1990's has attracted considerable public attention. It has been suggested that this crisis

in the banking industry is, at least partially, due to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation's (FDIC's) flat-rate insurance premium scheme. Such a pricing scheme is
argued as being unfair to well-run institutions and, in fact, encourages excessive risktaking by bank management. 1 In an attempt to reduce such incentives for moral hazard

in the banking industry, regulatory reforms have been proposed and implemented.
Among other things, these reforms have imposed risk-adjusted standards and closer
supervision of riskier banks in order to maintain the safety and soundness of the banking
industry, as well as to reduce the enormous burden that bank failures have imposed on
the FDIC's Bank Insurance Fund (BIF).
The most recent piece of banking legislation is the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), which was signed into law in December 1991.

This Act has several broad objectives, it intends to reform federal deposit insurance, to
protect deposit insurance funds, to recapitalize the bank insurance fund and to improve
supervision and regulation of insured depository institutions. In short, FDICIA intends
to protect the FDIC from further loss by adopting several measures that are aimed at
curbing moral hazard behavior by bank managers.
Two specific regulatory changes introduced by FDICIA are of particular
importance since they greatly alter the structure of the "regulatory safety net" previously
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in place. First, the Act incorporates a system of reassessment of deposit insurance
premia. This is the first legislative attempt at redressing the incentive for banks' moral
hazard behavior due to a flat-rate deposit in,surance scheme. FDICIA mandates a
reassessment of a bank's premium rate on a semi-annual basis in order to recapitalize
the bank insurance fund to the target reserve ratio in a period of fifteen years. Although
such an alternative premium structure is still not theoretically, actuarially fair (banks can
alter their portfolios immediately after a premium rate has been assessed), it
nevertheless is a significant move toward ameliorating the risk-taking incentive inherent
in a flat-rate deposit insurance premium structure that is based on an average risk
measure across all banks. Unlike the flat-rate system in place prior to FDICIA, the
premium rate under the new system is determined on a bank specific basis and thus, is
risk-adjusted insofar as the bank's own historical risk profile is explicitly considered
Further, the rate is reassessed semi-annually and thus, addresses any revisions in a bank's
risk profile to a considerable degree. Second, FDICIA greatly curtails banks' access to
the Federal Reserve discount window for emergency funds in periods of illiquidity. Such
credit, which is an important dimension of the regulatory "safety net," also provides banks
with a regulatory incentive for risk-taking since it is given at a subsidized rate (see Chen
and Mazumdar (1994a, 1994b) or Kaufman (1990)).
A central issue in the economics of regulation is identifying the intended and
unintended benefits of regulatory actions and the agents which are supposed to receive
them. A large body of literature examines the economic effects of regulation. Much of
this literature uses tools from welfare economics to assess the extent to which regulation
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affects market reactions. For example, in a seminal article, Stigler (1971) envisions a
positive economics of regulation as specifying the arguments underlying the supply and
demand for regulation. In his model, the good being transac.ted in the political market is
a transfer of wealth, with constituents on the demand side and their political
representatives on the supply side. The market distributes more of the good to that
group of constituents whose effective demand is highest In this economic view of
regulation, legislators do not necessarily promote the general welfare. Instead, benefits
are captured by a small but dominant coalition that has a large per capita stake.2
More recently, studies have relied on financial theory to infer the impact of
regulatory changes. As argued by Schwert (1981), if markets are strong-form efficient,
financial data is more informative than other measures because asset price movements
incorporate all relevant information as soon as it becomes available. Several recent
studies have employed stock market data to measure the effect of various regulatory
changes in the banking industry (e.g., Allen and Wilhelm (1988), Brickley and James
(1986), Cornett and Tehranian (1989, 1990), Flannery and James (1984), Musumeci and
Sinkey (1990a, 1990b), Sundaram, Rangan and Davidson (1992), and Unal (1989)).3
These studies utilize a financial theory paradigm to test for the effects of informational
change associated with regulatory reform on stock prices.4
Stigler (1971) posits that one coalition group can use the regulatory process to
improve its relative competitive position within the industty. Posner (1974) points out
that the differential effects of regulatory change on various industry members will cause
members to campaign for regulation in a differential manner. More specifically, Stigler
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(1974) argues that the incentive of large firms within the industry may differ substantially
from their smaller counterparts. Empirical evidence supports these views. Several
studies have found that the effects of a regulatory change are not homogeneous
throughout the industry. For example, James {1983) finds that bank deregulation of
deposit rate ceilings resulted in gains for wholesale banks but losses for commercial
banks. Allen and Wilhelm (1988) present evidence that the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 provided a wealth transfer from nonFederal Reserve System member banks and Savings and Loans (S&ls) to Federal
Reserve member banks and S&ls. Furthermore, Cornett and Tehranian (1989, 1990)
find that the banking deregulations passed in 1980 and 1982 benefited stockholders of
large banks and savings and loans, but produced negative abnormal stock returns for
small depository institutions.

In this paper, we examine the impact of information events in legislating and
adopting the FDICIA of 1991 on the market value and systematic risk of commercial
banks. We look at the individual and overall impact of announcements that advanced
the implementation of FDICIA on a sample of commercial banks grouped by asset size.
The results of the paper indicate that FDICIA did produce significant changes in the
value of commercial banks. Specifically, the empirical results show that the values of
large banks were positively affected as the passage of the proposed FDICIA became
evident, while the increased probability of passage resulted in negative ~ue changes for
smaller banks. The test results also show that the difference in market reactions for the
two samples (large versus small banks) was significant. Finally, we find that the
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systematic risk of the sample of large banks decreased significantly over a period
surrounding the passage of FDICIA, while no significant change was found for the
sample of small banks. Thus, the passage of FDICIA appears to have favored large
banks, both in terms of market value and systematic risk, at the expense of small banks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section ll describes the background
and economic consequences of FDICIA Section m introduces the data, methodology
and hypotheses concerning returns to common stockholders of commercial banks.
Section IV presents the resUlts for the stock returns. Section V examines the impact of
the Act on systematic risk of the commercial banks. Finally, Section VI concludes the
paper.

ll.

. Summary and Economic Consequences of FDICIA
The introduction and passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Improvement Act of 1991 was the resUlt of severe pressure on the profitability and
market share of commercial banks and the resUlting deterioration in the health of the
bank deposit insurance fund. RegUlators feared that bank insolvency cost coUld rise so

high that they woUld exhaust not only the resources of the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF),
but the financial ability of healthy banks to pay for them. Haunted by the collapse of
the savings and loan industry regUlators were moved to enact regulations which woUld
prevent a similar occurrence in the banking industry.
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While the stringent measures advocated by FDICIA reduced moral hazard
opportunities by all banks, the impact may not have been uniform throughout the
industry. As mentioned above, two particularly important regulatory changes introduced
by FDICIA were the introduction of a risk-based deposit insurance premium schedule
and restricted access to the Federal Resexve discount window. Both of these changes
have conflicting influences which may affect values of small banks differently from large
banks.
Recent empirical evidence indicates that small banks appear to undertake
significantly greater credit risk exposure (see Duan, Moreau and Sealey (forthcoming)).
Therefore, the reassessment of FDIC premia on a risk-adjusted basis is more likely to
adversely affect small banks. Since larger banks would be less liable for the restoration
of the bank deposit insurance fund to its target level, the stock returns of large banks
should increase in response to events signaling the positive probability of the passage of
FDICIA.
Conversely, Duan, Moreau and Sealey also provide evidence that large banks tend
to have greater interest rate risk. FDICIA explicitly recognizes the importance of
interest rate risk exposure in determining a bank's overall risk, and hence a bank's
capital adequacy according to the FDIC risk-adjusted premium schedule. Therefore, it is
feasible that if the FDIC risk-adjusted premium schedule places greater weight on
interest rate risk than on credit risk, small banks may benefit at the cost of larger banks.
FDICIA's emphasis on early closure and restricted access to subsidized credit
from the Federal Resexve discount window may also have conflicting influences on the
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relative impact of the Act on large and small banks. That is, the Federal Reserve's
guidelines clearly state that smaller banks have greater access to its discount window for
~adjustment credit" to meet liquidity needs.5 Since FDICIA intends to curb such discount

window borrowing, the loss of this facility is more likely to adversely affect small bank
than large bank stock returns.
The greater access small banks have to the discount window, however, does not
necessarily imply greater use by small banks. Indeed, recent theoretical and empirical
literature on banks' Federal funds (hereafter fed funds) activity provides some contrary
evidence. It has been found that larger, money center banks tend to be net borrowers
(buyers) in this inter-bank, short-term money market, while small banks tend to be net
sellers.6 Since the fed discount window and the fed funds market are alternative sources
of funds for meeting liquidity needs,7 and since the Federal Reserve guidelines prolnoit a
bank from borrowing at the discount window and simultaneously lending funds in any
other market (thereby earning an arbitrage interest spread), it follows that small banks,
which are net sellers in the fed funds market, rely relatively less on the fed's discount
window. Thus, any restrictions regarding discount window borrowing may affect larger
banks more than smaller banks since they appear to use the facility more (even though
smaller banks may have greater access to it).
Given the potential impact on commercial banks descnoed above, it is
hypothesized in this paper that the passage of FDICIA should have produced a
measurable impact on the returns to stockholders of these institutions and that
stockholders of large banks experienced wealth changes which were different from those
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of stockholders of small banks. In the next sections of the paper, the effect of the Act
on stock returns is examined.

m.

Data, Methodology and Hypotheses

The data to be analyzed consist of daily stock returns for

commer~al

banks that

were either listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock
Exchange (ASE), or traded in the Over-the-Counter (OTC) market between December
18, 1990 (when consideration of the new banking regulation was announced) and
December 20, 1991 (when the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act

was signed into law). To be included in the final sample a bank must trade during this
entire period. Daily return data were collected from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) data tapes where usable price records were found for 414 banks.
The tests performed on the sample require us to identify all dates on which
important new information about the regulation became publicly available. News items
pertaining to changes in regulation were compiled by examining the New York Times
Index.. the Wall Street Journal Index. the

Washin~on

Post Index. trade journals in

banking and FDIC news releases. Three time periods were examined: 1) the year
preceding the formal proposal of the regulation to Congress; 2) the period of enactment;
and 3) a period following the signing of FDICIA into law. Our search produced fifteen
events in which important information about passage of the regulation was announced.
Table !lists these fifteen events and the dates on which they occurred.8
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INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
In order to test for stock price reaction to regulatory change, it is necessary that
the events chosen for the test were unanticipated by the markets. Throughout the period
of passage of FDICIA, uncertainty about the outcome of the bill was high. As stated in
the Wall Street Journal on February 6, 1991 (p. A10) "...prospects for passage are highly
uncertain. In addition to controversies surrounding its own bill, the Bush bill will
compete with several other large banking packages." Examining the articles relating to
the fifteen events studied here, it appears that in several instances new information was
contained in the announcement. For example, the first three events revealed the initial
details of the banking overhaul. These announcements outlined, for the first time,
specific regulations introduced in the bill. Event 7 (Banking bill clears House panel by
36 to 0 vote) came as a surprise and sharply increased the probability of passage of the
banking bill. While the vote was expected to be favorable prior to the event, it was not
expected to be unanimous (thus, sending such a strong signal). As stated in the~
Street Journal article, "yesterday, though, it was a combination of Republicans and
freshmen Democrats under intense lobbying pressure from banks that prevailed...."
Event 8 (key lawmakers resisting quick passage of broad banking reform sought by Bush)
also was unexpected. On June 11, 1991, the General Accounting Office warned that the
bank insurance fund may be exhausted in six months. Later that day in a meeting
between several key legislators and White House officials "several members said they
believe that the more urgent matter of insurance fund should be addressed first, and
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separately" (Wall Street Journal. June 12, 1991, p. A2). The members said they would
not rush the banking bill through as requested by President Bush, thus reducing the
probability of passage in 1991. A final, although not inclusive, example is event 12
(House defeats banking bill). While the defeat of the banking bill was a ·resounding one
(324 to 89 to defeat the bill), the day prior to the vote the outcome was uncertain. As
stated in the November 4, 1991 Wall Street Journal (p. A3), "Banking Committee
Chairman Henry Gonzalez gave the legislation only a 50-50 chance of House passage.
Rep. Chalmers Wylie of Ohio, the ranking Republican on the House banking panel said
the outcome is 'too close to call.'" Thus many of the events examined here did, in fact,
contain new information concerning passage of the regulation.

In order to isolate the effect of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 on large versus sm.all banks, the sample of 414 banks was
subdivided into two groups based on total assets at the end of 1990. Following the
delineation of big versus small banks found by Allen, Peristiani and Saunders (1989) in
the usage of fed funds and repurchase agreement markets, we define sm.all banks as
those with book value of total assets less than or equal to $1 billion and large banks as
those with book value of total assets greater than $1 billion. This break-down produced
214 small banks and 200 large banks for our analysis. The event-study methodology
described in the next section allows us to identify the impact of FDICIA using these
subsets of banks.
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B.

Methodoloi}'
The stock price impact of regulatory reform is estimated by employing a

Multivariate Regression Model (MVRM) similar to_ that used in Schipper and Thompson
(1983), Binder (1985a, 198Sb, 1988), Rose (1985), Smith, Bradley and Jarrell (1986) and
Cornett and Tehranian (1989, 1990). The MVRM is used because it explicitly
incorporates cross-sectional heteroscedasticity across equations and contemporaneous
dependence of the disturbances into the estimation process, allowing joint hypotheses to
be tested utilizing the F-statistic defined by Rao (1973). Specifically, as pointed out by
Fama (1976), because the magnitude of the unsystematic risk differs across firms, the
variance in abnormal returns will vary across firms. In addition, Schwert (1981) states
that individual asset returns for firms in the same industry measured over a common
time period are contemporaneously correlated because firms react similarly to any
unanticipated event. Thus, contrary to the requirements of the standard event study
methodology, residuals will not be identically and independently distributed.
The MVRM model uses a system of seemingly unrelated equations which
explicitly conditions the return generating process on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of
an event. This conditioning is accomplished by appending zero-one dummy variables to
the market model equation. The variable is set equal to one if an event occurred and
equal to zero otherwise. Since the exact timing of the information release is unknown, a
three-day event period is used corresponding to trading days t

= -1, t = 0 and t = + 1

relative to the announcement dates listed in Table 1. The coefficients multiplying the
event dummy variables measure the event's impact on stock returns. The model,
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therefore, implies a system of portfolio return equations for two portfolios: (1) large
banks and (2) small banks.9

(1)

where

=

The return on a portfolio j ( = 1 and 2), of commercial banks on day
t (T = daily observations from September 1990 through March
1992); returns for each portfolio are weighted based on the full
estimated covariance matrix of residuals in order to increase the
efficiency of parameter estimates;
the return on the CRSP equally weighted index on day t;

Yjt

=
=
=
=

Dtt

=

dummy variables which equal 1 during the period of the kth

=

random disturbances which are assumed to be normal and
independent of the return on the market and the event
announcement variable.

~
aj
.Bjl -

.B.jS

ejt

an intercept coefficient for portfolio j ( = 1 and 2);
risk coefficients for the jth portfolio (j = 1 and 2);10
the effect of the K regulatory changes on the jth portfolio (K = 15
in this study);
announcement and 0 othetwise;11 and,

Following Theil (1971, p. 306), the system of regressions in equation (1) can be
generalized as
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(2)

where

X

-

=

T x 1 vector (the elements of the vector are ~ 1, ~

•••, ~J;

=

a T x N matrix of independent variables which is the same for each
equation in the system, N = K + 2 = 17 (the first column o(Jhis
matrix is of l's, the second column is of the daily returns on ~'
and the last fifteen columns are of dummy variables, Dtt for each of
the fifteen events);

=

a N x 1 vector of coefficients;

=

a T x 1 vector of disturbances,

or

R=Xi+i.

(3)

Estimation of the multivariate regression model in equation (3) assumes that the
residuals are independent and identically distributed within each equation. Similar to
Smith, Bradley and Jarrell (1986), however, it is unlikely that abnormal returns created
by the events under study are fixed but unknown effects that are fully explained by the
arguments in equation (3). If so, the conditional and unconditional distributions of
abnormal returns would not be the same and the variance-Covariance matrix for the
residuals in equation (3) would not be independent of the realization of the event. Thus,
estimation of the system in equation (3) must be adjusted for the possible
heteroscedasticity.12 To correct for time-series heteroscedasticity, a procedure developed
by White (1982) and Chamberlain (1982) is employed. This procedure lets the residuals
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in the variance-co-variance matrix vary across observations.
The main advantage of the MVRM methodology is in the joint hypothesis testing,
since the possibility of heteroscedasticity across equations and contemporaneous
dependence of the disturbances are explicitly incorporated into the hypothesis test. To
test the joint hypotheses in the MVRM, an F-test defined by Rao (1973) and used by
Binder (198Sa, 198Sb) is employed.13 The joint hypothesis tests are of special
importance in this study since, as discussed earlier, firms are expected to be differentially
affected by FDICIA.

C.

Testable fupotheses
Familiar hypotheses about average or cumulative average abnormal returns, as

well as more general hypotheses, can be tested within the framework discussed above.
Specifically, the following hypotheses are formulated and tested.

Hypothesis 1:

yJk

= 0""; the abnormal return for each portfolio equal zero

on announcement day k.

Hypothesis 2:

:D~ 1 yJl

= o""; the overall economic impact of the Federal

Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
equals zero for each portfolio.
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fV.

Results

A

Tests of fupothesis 1: The Abnormal Return for Each Portfolio Equal Zero on
Announcement Day k
Table 2 reports results on the MVRM analysis when the sample banks are

grouped by book value of total assets. Panel A shows the portfolio abnormal returns and
the t-statistics for each of the fifteen events across the 214 small banks and 200 large
banks. These estimates are the coefficients of the dummy variables in equation 3.
Column 1 lists the events and Columns 2 and 3 present the results for the two portfolios.

INSERT TABLE 2 HERE

As shown in Column 2 of Table 2 only one event produces positive and significant
(at the 0.10 level) three-day cumulative average abnormal returns to stockholders of

small banks, i.e., event 12 (banking bill voted down in the House), while four events
produce negative and significant abnormal returns, i.e., event 1 (regulators press weak
banks to reduce dividends), event 2 (banking blueprint may propose diversified holding
companies), event 7 (banking bill clears House panel by 36 to 0 vote) and event 15
(Bush signs banking bill). For the remaining ten events no statistically significant
investor reaction was identified. Interestingly, the significant positive cumulative
abnormal return is associated with an event which indicated a decreased probability of
successful passage of the bill, while the four events demonstrating significant negative
abnormal returns are all associated with events which signaled an increase in the
probability of passage of the bill.
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Two events (event 3: big banks would get vastly broader powers under Treasury's
plan, and event

~5:

Bush signs banking bill) produced positive cumulative abnormal

returns. for the sample of large banks, while one event (event 8: key lawmakers resisting
quick passage of broad banking reforms) resulted in significant negative abnormal
returns for this group. Contrary to the sample of small banks, the positive abnormal
returns are associated with events that signal an increase in the probability of passage of
FDICIA, while the negative abnormal returns are associated with events that signal a
decrease in passage.
Binomial tests on the number of positive and negative abnormal returns for the
events which were significant in Table 2 were all significant at better than the 0.05 level
For events 1, 2, 7, 12 and 15, out of the 214 small banks 79, 85, 87, 119 and 94
respectively, experienced positive abnormal returns. For events 3, 8 and 15, out of the
200 large banks 120, 78 and 125, respectively, had positive abnormal returns. Thus the
results do not appear to be driven by outliers.
The results from Panel A of Table 2 allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the
abnormal return for each portfolio equal zero on every announcement day. Rather, it
appears that the values of large banks were positively affected as passage of the
proposed FDICIA became evident, while the increased probability of passage created
negative value changes for smaller banks.
To further test hypothesis 1, panel B of Table 2 reports the F-statistic for the
significance of the difference between portfolio abnormal returns for small versus large
banks for each event. The F-statistic is significant at better than the 0.10 level for events
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1, 2, 3, 7, 12 and 15. These results suggest that large banks reacted significantly more
favorably to events which indicated an increased probability of passage and significantly
less favorably to events w}lich indicated a decreased probability of passage of FDICIA.

As discussed in Section n, it appears that small banks, with relatively larger credit
risk and reduced ability to access the discount window (rather than large ·banks with
relatively larger interest rate risk and heavy discount window use) experienced a heavier
cost from the implementation of the new regulation. The new regulation meant that the
largest banks would not have to shoulder more than their share of future costs of deposit
insurance nor would they experience reduced access to funds to the same extent as the
small banks. This resulted in indirect benefits to this group.

B.

. Test of fupothesis 2: The Overall Economic Impact of the federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act Equals Zero for Each Portfolio

In addition to the identification of the significance for each announcement day, of
particular interest to this study is a test of the hypothesis that the overall economic
impact of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act was significant
for the various portfolio groupings during the entire 15-event announcement period.
Focusing attention on tests that measure abnormal returns on and around all fifteen
announcements provides valuable information about the wealth impact of the new
regulation on different firms within the commercial banking industry.
Using the notation in equation (3), Hypothesis 2 can be expressed in the form

LB =

'L
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where L is a P x N matrix of constants with rank P(P

s K), 13 is the N x 1 vector of

coefficients estimated from (2), ' is a P x 1 vector of constants and P is the number
restrictions tested in the system. As de~cribed in Theil (1971, pgs. 314, 402) the statistic
JT- JN (1-LJ)'{L[X'(l:-1®1 )X]-1L'}-1(1 - Li)
P

c.B. -

xm'<t- ®1 >cB - x.A)
1

where
=

[aiJ], i, j = 1, 2, .••, J;

=

the Kronecker product;

T

=

the number of daily return observations ( = 272) used for
estimation parameter in equation {1);

J

=

the number of portfolios tested; and

p

=

the number of restrictions tested,

is asymptotically distributed as F{P, JT- JN).
Separating the sample on the basis of asset size, the F-statistic implied by H 0 for
the 214 small banks is 5.20 and for the 200 large banks is 2.05. Given the critical value
F{14,504,0.01)14 = 3.00, these statistics suggest that the overall economic impact of
FDICIA to stockholders of small banks was significantly different from the Act's impact
to stockholders of large banks. Specifically, the approval of FDICIA resulted in
significantly smaller abnormal returns to stockholders of small banks than that of large
banks. The relatively large increase in the deposit insurance premiums and the more
limited access to the discount window for the smallest banks caused the value of these
banks to decrease and the value of the larger, healthier banks to increase during the
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period of consideration and passage of the new regulation. This pattern of wealth
distribution within the commercial banking industry is consistent with the economic
theory of Stigler (1971).

V.

The Impact of FDICIA on the Systematic Risk of Commercial Bai:llcs

In addition to tests of stock price reactions associated with information events
leading to the passage of FDICIA, the economic theory of Stigler (1971) and Peltzman
(1976) suggests that the riskiness of firms in the regulated industry must be examined as
well. In particular, Peltzman hypothesizes that increases in regulation reduce the
riskiness of the firms being regulated in terms of the demand and cost of uncertainty.
With respect to FDICIA, this "buffering effect" hypothesis suggests that the systematic
risk of banks should decrease during the enactment period if the regulation is viewed by
the market as being more protective in nature and should increase if the regulation
subjects banks to additional competitive pressures.15
To test the Pe1tzman "buffering effect" hypothesis, the following three broad
periods were used:

1.

pre-FDICIA enactment period (1/1/90 - 12/17/90);

2.

FDICIA enactment period (12/18/90 - 12/20/91);

3.

post-FDICIA enactment period (12/21/91 - 12/21/92).

Within each period we computed the systematic risk of the sample banks' common stock
(splitting the sample based on the book value of assets). The results of these analyses
are reported in Table 3.
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INSERT TABLE 3 HERE

As seen in Table 3 the systematic risk, .B, of the small banks in the sample went
from 1.0665 prior to consideration of FDICIA, to 0.9565 during the period of enactment,
to 0.9124 following the passage of FDICIA. All three of these coefficients are significant
at better than the 0.01 level. While there is a decreasing trend in systematic risk over
the three time periods, the drop in the risk is not significant. The t-statistic for the
difference in systematic risk in the first (prior to consideration of FDICIA) versus second
(during the period in which FDICIA was considered and enacted) period is 1.62, which is
insignificant at all conventional levels. The t-statistic for the difference in systematic risk

in the second versus third (after passage of FDICIA) periods, 1.04, is also insignificant.
For the sample of large banks, Table 3 reports a drop in systematic risk from 0.9554
prior to consideration of FDICIA, to 0.8924 during the period of enactment, to 0.6182
following the passage of FDICIA. All of these coefficients are significant at better than
the 0.01 level. Further, the drop in systematic risk across the three time periods is
significant. The difference in systematic risk in the first versus third period, 0.3372, is
significant at better than 0.01level (t-statistic equals 4.05). The same level of
significance is seen across periods two versus three (t-statistic equals 4.75), but not in
periods one versus two (t-statistic equals 1.21).
From the results presented in Table 3 it appears that the market reacted as if the
passage of FDICIA created a "buffer" against competitive pressures for large banks, but
had no affect on the competition extant for small banks. If we recall the two major
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legislative changes associated with FDICIA and discussed earlier, some reasons for these
differences in systematic risk of the banks are evident First, the change to risk-adjusted
deposit insurance premia and the resulting shift of deposit insurance premiums from
those banks which were least likely to need the coverage to those which had a higher
probability of needing the coverage produced a "buffering effect" for the large (less risky)
banks but not for the small (more risky) banks. Second, the loss of greater access to the
discount window by small banks (relative to large banks) meant that these banks would
be subject to greater increases in the competition for alternate sources of funds. Larger
banks, which were not using the discount window to the same extent as small banks,
were not subjected to this increase in competition for funds. Thus, consistent with the
results for stock returns discussed in Section IV, FDICIA created a "buffer" for large
banks against increases in competition in the industry which was not also.created for
small banks.
To see the effects of FDICIA on stock performance more clearly, we analyzed the
stock returns over the three subperiods around the passage of FDICIA. In particular, we
computed the market-model residuals (alpha) for the three time periods discussed above:
1) prior to the consideration of FDICIA (1/1/90 - 12/17/90); 2) during the enactment of
FDICIA (12/18/90 - 12/29/91); and 3) following the passage of FDICIA (12/21/91 12/21/92). The results are reported in Table 3. From Table 3 its is seen that regardless
of bank size or time period the market-model residuals are relatively low in magnitude
and statistically insignificant There is no evidence indicating a particular market
reaction around the passage of FDICIA.
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VI.

Conclusion
This paper examines the impact·of events leading up to the passage of the

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 on the market value
and systematic risk of commercial banks. Splitting the sample into large and small banks
(based on the book value of total assets), we find that FDICIA did produce significant
changes in the value of commercial banks. Specifically, the empirical

res~ts

document

that the values of large banks were positively affected as passage of the proposed
FDICIA became evident, while the increased probability of passage resulted in negative
value changes for smaller banks. We also find that the systematic risk of the sample of
large banks decreased significantly over the period surrounding passage of FDICIA,
while no significant change was found for the sample of small banks.
Two major changes associated with FDICIA were the introduction of risk-based
deposit insurance and the limit of access to the Federal Reserve's discount window. The
empirical results in this paper leads to the conclusion that the shift of deposit insurance
premiums from those banks which were least likely to need the coverage to those which
had a higher probability of needing coverage and the relatively larger impact of the
reduction in access to the discount window, caused the value of small banks to decrease
while the value of large banks increased. Additionally, the buffering that these
legislative changes introduced for large banks relative to small banks resulted in a
decrease in the systematic risk of large banks.
Finally, our results suggest that FDICIA may have some far-reaching policy
implications in the long run. Since FDICIA appears to be favorably slanted towards
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large banks it may lead to a greater degree of consolidation in the U.S. banking industry.
Such consolidation would make U.S. banks more competitive with foreign banks which
have significa.ntly increased their presence in the U.S. over the past decade.16 Indeed,
such consolidation may be an indirect policy objective and would be consistent with other
explicit new regulatory controls that FDICIA has simultaneously imposed on foreign
banks in the U.S., and which also aim to reduce the competitive edge that such banks
have enjoyed in the past (see Section 202 of FDICIA).
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TABLE 1
M~or

Event

Announcements and Announcement Dates Leading Up to the Approval
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act

Date

Description

1

12-18-90

Regulators press weak banks to
capital

2

1-4-91

Banking blueprint may propose diversified holding companies

3

2-6-91

Big banks would get vastly broader powers under Treasury's plan

4

3-21-91

Bush introduces bill to overhaul bank industry

5

4-11-91

Fed signals its support for major parts of Treasury plan to overhaul
banking; Bush's bank overhaul plan faces delay in House panel

6

4-24-91

Administration may scale down its banking bill; broad bill to reform
banking industry gets bipartisan support of House panel

7

5-24-91

Banking bill clears House panel by 36 to 0 vote

8

6-12-91

Key lawmakers resisting quick passage of broad ba.nking reforms
sought by Bush

9

7-1-91

House panel approves bill to reform banking laws

10

8-2-91

Senate panel clears plan to discourage long-term Fed loans to weak
banks; Senate panel's banking bill faces hurdles

11

10-4-91

Banking panel in House holds to broad bill

12

11-5-91

Banking bill is voted down in the House

13

11-15-91

House defeats banking bill

14

11-20-91

·House and Senate pass bill

15

12-20-91

Bush signs banking bill that bolsters deposit insurance fund and
tightens rules.

reduc~

dividends to shore up equity
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TABLE2

Test of Hypothesis That All Abnormal Returns for Each Portfolio
Jointly Equal

zero

Panel A of this table presents portfolio abnormal returns and t-statistics (in parenthesis) for 214
small and 200 large banks around each of the fifteen events. These estimates are from a regression
of portfolio returns (weighted based on the full estimated covariance matrix of residuals) and
dummy variables corresponding to the fifteen events. Each dummy variable equals 1 during the
three-day period (t = -1, t = 0, and t = 1 relative to each announcement) and 0 otherwise. Panel
B presents the F-statistic for the difference in portfolio abnormal returns.
Event
1

2
3

4

5
6

7
8
9

10
11

12
13

Panel A: Portfolio abnormal returns (in percent)
Small Banks
Large Banks
N = 214
N = 200

-3.17
(-2.21)c:
-4.23
(-2.81)b
-2.00
(-1.32)
0.00
(0.06)
2.09
(1.14)
1.31
(0.88)
-2.85
(-2.18)c
1.11
(0.74)
-1.24
(-0.83)
1.26
(0.84)
1.07
(0.71)
2.09
(1.87)d
1.15
(0.76)

14

-1.28

15

(-0.86)
-1.60
(-1.65)d

~vents

are described in Table 1.
bSignificant at the .01 level.
csignificant at the .05 level.
4Significant at the .10 level.

1.09
(0.75)
1.05
(0.73)
2.18
(1.78)d
1.39
(0.89)
1.26
(0.69)
1.65
(0.91)

Panel B:
F-Statistic

5.15

5.07"
1.62
1.00
0.12

1.51
(0.86)
-2.23
(-1.88)d

2.20

1.55

1.70

(0.89)
1.78
(1.03)
1.12
(0.78)
-1.74
(-1.02)
-0.92
(-0.70)
1.21
(0.72)
2.18
(1.92)d

0.38
0.10
3.ogd

1.29

1.59
4.2<1
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TABLE3
Systematic Risk (Betas) and Market-Model Residuals (Alphas) for Small and Large•
Commercial Banks During Three Periods SWTOunding the Enactment of FDICIA: 1) A Period
Prior to Consideration of FDICIA; 2) A Period During the Enactment of FDICIA; and 3) A
Period Following the Passage of FDICIA

Coefficient

Small Banks (N =214)
T-statistic
P-valuc

J..ame BanJcs (N =200)
Coefficient

T-statistic

P-valuc

1) Prior to Consideration of FDICIA, 1/1/90 - 12/17/90
Systematic Risk, 8
Market-Model

1.0665

Residual, a -0 .0005

25.960 b

0.0001

0.9554

42 .812 b

0.0001

0.270

0.7871

0.0002

0.584

0.5594

2) During Enactment of FDICIA, 12/18/90 - 12/'11J/91
Systematic Risk, 8
Market-Model

0.9565

Residuals, a 0.0003

34.518 b

0.0001

0.8924

37.688 b

0.0001

0.301

0.7638

0.0001

0.223

0.8235

3) Following Passage of FDICIA, 12/21/91 - 12/21/92
Systematic Risk, 8
Market-Model

0.9124

Residuals, a 0.0001

35.013 b

0.0001

0.6182

36.744 b

0.0001

0.481

0.7871

-0 .0002

-0 .250

0.8030

•small banks are defined as those with book value of total assets less than or equal to $1
billion and large banks are defined as those with book value of total assets greater than $1
billion.
bSignificant at the .01 level.
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F001NOTES
1There

are a host of papers that address this issue of mispriced deposit insurance
both theoretically and empirically. See, for example, Chen and Mazumdar (1994a,
1994b), Crouhy and Galai (1991), Flannery (1989), Pennacchi (1987), Ronn and Verma
(1986), Marcus (1984), Marcus and Shaked (1984) and Buser, Chen and Kane (1981).
2Peltzman

(1976) expands upon Stigler's (1971) model in an effort to determine
the optimal size of the dominant group. He finds that the cost of using the regulatory
process limits not only the size of the dominant group but also the gains. Posner (1974),
Pyle (1974), Scott and Mayer (1971) and Taggart and Greenbaum (1978) provide
additional insights into the economic effects of regulation.
3Allen

and Wilhelm (1988) and Cornett and Tehranian (1989) test stock market
reactions to the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980.
Brickley and James (1986) analyze how access to deposit insurance affects common stock
returns of financial institutions during periods of financial distress. Cornett and
Tehranian (1990) use stock returns to measure the effects ·of the Gam-St. Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982. Flannery and James (1984) examine the relation
between interest rate sensitivity of common stock returns and the maturity composition
of the firm's nominal contracts. Musumeci and Sinkey (1990a) examine bank security
returns surrounding the announcement of Brazil's debt moratorium in 1987. Musumeci
and Sinkey (1990b) use event-study methodology to examine security returns for the
twenty-five largest U.S. bank holding companies surrounding Citicorp's $3 billion loanloss-reserve decision of May 19, 1987. Sundaram, Rangan and Davidson (1992) use
capital market data to examine the impact of the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989. Finally, Unal (1989) provides a comparative
analysis of the switching-regressions method and variance-partition procedure within the
context of deposit-rate ceiling change announcements.
4As

a result, a regulatory effect which has been documented is the incurrence of
pecuniary economies by the regulated firm in its resource market. Furthermore, because
of the protected nature of its product market, all or a portion of the operational and
financial risk is reduced. These additional returns may be thought of as indirect
subsidies passed from consumers and non-regulated producers to the regulated firm.
Thus, investors react to the indirect subsidy by factoring above-normal returns into the
assessment of future profitability.
5See

Publication.

Federal Reserve Discount Window. October 1980, Federal Reserve
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6Several

theoretical explanations have been offered to explain this phenomenon.
First, it has been argued that small banks are more risk averse than big banks.
Therefore, small banks prefer to raise funds through traditional deposit markets (see Ho
and Saunders (1985) and Allen, Peristiani and Saunders (1989}, among others). Second,
small banks have local monopoly power in their deposit markets and thus, are able to
obtain deposit funds at relatively lower costs while charging higher loan rates (see
Hannan and Hanweck (1988) and Rose and Kolari (1985)). A third explanation is based
on information asymmetries. Allen and Saunders (1986) argue that since fed funds are
uncollateralized, lenders (fed funds sellers) perceive smaller banks to have higher default
risks and thus offer them fed funds at higher rates or even ration them out.
Informational asymmetries would therefore limit small banks' access to fed funds.
and Mazumdar (1992) focus on the close link between reserve management
and fed funds purchases as alternative sources of liquidity. They provide an inventory
theoretic explanation of the large-small bank dichotomy observed in the fed funds
market and also provide an integrated framework that incorporates the three influences
on fed funds behavior listed in footnote 6.
·
7Chen

8Many

other announcements besides the fifteen listed in Table 1 were made
concerning the new regulation. For example, on May 2, 1991 Democrats on the House
Banking Committee voted to consider the banking legislation before a bill to bolster the
bank deposit insurance fund. This increased the probability that a decision on the bill
would come before the end of 1991. In this paper, however, only those announcements
which we felt referred to major changes in the reform, stumbling blocks to passage or
passage by a key group are analyzed.
~e models used in previous studies are slightly different from equation (1). We

employ the market return at several leads and lags as an explanatory variable to
overcome the possibility of nonsynchronous trading in our sample (see Scholes and
Williams, 1977).
1'7he

pre (before 12-18-90) and post (after 12-20-91) FDICA periods were
examined for significant shifts in the risk parameters for both subgroups of banks. A
significant change in .Bj for the large bank subgroup during the period prior to the first
announcement relating to the new regulation (12-18-90) and a period after the regulation
was approved (12-20-91} was found. We discuss this in detail in Section V of the paper.
11Depending

on what time during the trading day the announcement was made,
either the publication day or the day before might be the relevant announcement day.
Since the exact time of the announcement is unknown, the announcement period is the
three trading days, t = -1, t = 0 and t = +1, relative to the published announcement.
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12See

Smith, Jarrell and Bradley (1986, p. 477) for a detailed discussion of this

situation.
use an F-test because Binder (1985b) presents evidence that in some cases
the Wald test might be biased against the null hypothesis when there are 60 or even 250
observations per equation.
13We

degrees of freedom, 504, equal (2 (the number of portfolios) • 272 (the
number of observations)) - (2 (the number of portfolios) *20 (the number of
independent variables in the regression equation 1)).
1'7he

and Merville (1986) also test for a "buffering effect" associated with the
breakup of AT&T.
15Chen

instance, in 1987 alone business loans at U.S. branch offices of foreign banks
grew five times faster than at U.S.-owned banks (see Mazumdar 1990).
16por
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